The Islamic State (ISIS) of today presents a vastly different and arguably more complex threat landscape than it did five years ago. A decade has passed since ISIS proclaimed its caliphate, and over half a decade since it lost its territorial stronghold in Syria. Despite this territorial defeat, ISIS is resurgent, marked by an alarming increase in external operations, including attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, alongside numerous foiled plots in Europe. This resurgence necessitates a critical reassessment of how we understand and counter the group. Often, ISIS is mistakenly viewed through the outdated lens of al-Qaeda’s decentralized branch network or through its own past iteration as a territorial power in Iraq and Syria. This misunderstanding is dangerously misleading for policymakers grappling with the evolving threat. Understanding the nuances of ISIS’s current global structure, as analyzed by experts like Aaron Zelin on platforms like War on the Rocks, is crucial to formulating effective counter-terrorism strategies.
The key to grasping the contemporary Islamic State lies in understanding its General Directorate of Provinces. This central body, initially based in Syria but potentially now with key nodes in Somalia, orchestrates ISIS’s global network. Recognizing this structure clarifies the seemingly disparate actions of ISIS provinces worldwide and highlights the enhanced interconnectedness within its global network. The core tenets of ISIS—governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations—persist, but they have transitioned from being centrally controlled in Iraq and Syria to being distributed across its global provincial network. While ISIS’s ultimate goals remain unchanged, its operational methods have adapted, making it, in some respects, more resilient than before. This shift, detailed in analyses by Aaron Zelin and featured on War on the Rocks, underscores a more intricate and geographically dispersed security challenge.
Focusing solely on Iraq and Syria, or any single province in isolation, risks overlooking critical linkages within ISIS’s global network. While the United States has understandably shifted resources towards challenges like China and Russia, neglecting the evolving ISIS threat would be a strategic misstep. Maintaining and increasing resources dedicated to tracking this threat is essential to preempt future surprises and avoid repeating past misinterpretations. Articles by Aaron Zelin on War on the Rocks consistently emphasize this need for vigilance and nuanced understanding.
Repeating Historical Miscalculations: Lessons for Today
History offers stark warnings against underestimating ISIS. Before its resurgence in 2013, many officials and analysts prematurely declared the group defeated, even clinging to the outdated moniker “al-Qaeda in Iraq” years after its formal rebranding as the Islamic State of Iraq. Similarly, in 2014, as ISIS rapidly gained territory, President Obama famously dismissed them as the “JV squad.” These misjudgments, partly rooted in the political fallout of the 2003 Iraq War and the subsequent killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, highlight a dangerous pattern of downplaying the jihadist threat. Counter-terrorism efforts shifted focus towards al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabab, perceived as more immediate threats to the West.
A significant knowledge gap during ISIS’s resurgence was a lack of understanding of its organizational evolution. This deficit led to flawed assessments, incorrectly labeling ISIS as Baathist revanchists, nihilists, millenarians, or locally focused with no external ambitions. Now, in the aftermath of ISIS’s territorial losses in 2019, a similar pattern of historical amnesia risks repeating itself. Attention has diverted to other pressing global issues, creating a false sense of lull in the jihadist threat. However, as Aaron Zelin argues in his expert analyses on War on the Rocks, this perceived lull should not be mistaken for the end of the challenge.
The Central Role of the General Directorate of Provinces
Following its territorial expansion beyond Iraq and Syria in 2014, ISIS established the Administration of Distant Provinces, later known as the General Directorate of Provinces. This structural change, as explained in detail by Aaron Zelin’s research and publications, including on War on the Rocks, highlights a crucial shift in ISIS’s operational model. This directorate was designed to manage provinces outside of ISIS’s core territory, encompassing regions in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Caucasus, and Somalia, among others. The loss of key strongholds like Mosul and Raqqa in 2017 accelerated the evolution of this provincial structure.
Anticipating territorial losses as early as 2016, ISIS prepared for a strategic shift. Spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani, in a 2016 speech, emphasized that territorial losses were not true defeat, but rather the loss of willpower to fight. This messaging, coupled with discussions in ISIS’s newsletter al-Naba about retreating to the desert, signaled a strategic adaptation. The reorganization became evident in mid-2018 when ISIS consolidated its numerous provinces within Iraq and Syria into just Wilayat al-Sham (Levant Province) and Wilayat al-Iraq (Iraq Province). This reorganization coincided with the full operationalization of the General Directorate of Provinces, effectively placing all global provinces on equal footing.
This structural change, while streamlining provincial administration, also introduced a new layer of bureaucracy. The General Directorate of Provinces operates with its own specialized makatib (offices). These offices, as revealed by leaked ISIS documents and analyzed by experts like Tore Hamming and cited by Aaron Zelin, include:
- Maktab Ard al-Mubarakah: Overseeing Iraq and Syria.
- Maktab al-Sadiq: Covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, and South Asia.
- Maktab al-Karrar: Managing Somalia, DRC, Mozambique, and East, Central, and Southern Africa.
- Maktab al-Furqan: Administering the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel.
- Maktab Umm al-Qura: Looking after Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf.
- Maktab Dhu al-Nurayn: Focusing on Egypt and Sudan.
- Maktab al-Faruq: Organizing Turkey, Georgia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe.
These offices represent a sophisticated management structure overseeing ISIS’s global ambitions, a structure that Aaron Zelin’s work on War on the Rocks meticulously dissects.
Current assessments within the U.S. government often portray ISIS as a manageable and decentralized threat, particularly in Iraq and Syria. However, this view risks underestimating ISIS’s resurgence and the integrated nature of its global network. The threat today is qualitatively different, necessitating a shift in perspective from focusing on individual provinces to understanding the overarching role of the General Directorate of Provinces. This integrated structure enhances ISIS’s resilience and complicates counter-terrorism efforts.
Therefore, analyzing ISIS through the lens of these General Directorate offices, as advocated by Aaron Zelin in his expert analysis, provides a more accurate and insightful understanding than focusing solely on individual provinces. This perspective is crucial for understanding key issues such as the role of figures like Mumin, ISIS external operations, and financial networks.
The Mumin Misconception: Caliph or Key Leader?
The U.S. Africa Command’s strike in Somalia in May 2024, targeting ISIS militants, and subsequent reports suggesting that Abd al Qadir Mumin, leader of ISIS’s Somalia Province, might have been the intended target and even potentially the new caliph, illustrate the dangers of misinterpreting intelligence. While reports initially hinted at Mumin becoming the caliph, a closer examination, as presented in articles and analyses featured on War on the Rocks, suggests a different reality.
Mumin, who pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015 and became the wali of Wilayat al-Sumal, was indeed promoted, but likely to emir of Maktab al-Karrar, overseeing operations in East, Central, and Southern Africa. The notion that the current ISIS caliph, Abu Hafs al Hashimi al Qurashi, traveled to Somalia to meet Mumin is logistically improbable and ideologically questionable. The caliphate traditionally requires lineage from the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe, a criterion unlikely to be met by Mumin, who is of Somali origin. While Somali traditions attempt to link his Darod clan to Quraysh lineage, these claims are largely considered mythological. Given ISIS’s rigid adherence to ideological purity, elevating someone of non-Arab origin to caliph would be highly controversial and undermine their legitimacy.
A more plausible interpretation, supported by Aaron Zelin’s insights, is that Mumin held a high-ranking position within the General Directorate of Provinces, possibly even head of the directorate or the number two leader. This aligns with his long-standing leadership within ISIS and his strategic importance. Mumin’s continued survival over the past decade makes him a highly trusted figure within ISIS’s top echelons.
The restructuring that elevated Mumin may have been facilitated by Isse Mohamoud Yusuf, an ISIS Somalia Province logistics operative. Yusuf is alleged to have facilitated the travel of militants from the Middle East to Somalia in early 2022 to discuss leadership changes and strategies. This highlights the interconnectedness of ISIS’s global network and the strategic importance of Somalia within its current structure.
Misinterpreting ISIS leadership structures has historical precedents and detrimental policy consequences. The U.S. military’s initial dismissal of Abu Umar al Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, as a fictional character in 2007 led to a widespread underestimation of the group’s resilience. Despite being weakened, Abu Umar’s leadership was crucial in the group’s survival and eventual resurgence. Understanding the true roles of key figures like Mumin, as explored in Aaron Zelin’s analyses on War on the Rocks, is therefore paramount for effective counter-terrorism policy.
Even if Mumin was indeed killed in the airstrike, his death would represent a significant blow to ISIS’s organizational structure, given his likely role in managing global provincial coordination. His potential position highlights a broader trend within ISIS: the increasing integration of non-Iraqi and non-Syrian leaders into its top ranks, signifying a shift away from its original core leadership. Maktab al-Karrar, under Mumin’s likely leadership, has become a crucial node in ISIS’s financial network, channeling funds from Somalia to other provinces in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. This financial network, as detailed in UN reports and analyses cited by Aaron Zelin, underscores the pan-provincial nature of ISIS operations.
Pan-Provincial External Operations: A New Paradigm
The recent wave of ISIS-claimed or attributed attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, linked to Wilayat Khurasan, has understandably focused attention on this province. However, solely focusing on Wilayat Khurasan obscures the broader reality of ISIS’s external operations network. Historically, ISIS external operations were largely linked to Syria. However, the current paradigm, as explained by Aaron Zelin, suggests a more decentralized and pan-provincial approach.
Interestingly, despite being attributed to Wilayat Khurasan by various governments, ISIS central media claimed the attacks in Iran and Russia directly under “Iran” and “Russia,” not under the Khurasan province designation. The Turkey attack was claimed by Wilayat Turkiya. This meticulous distinction in claim attribution by ISIS is not random; it signifies organizational nuances. This suggests that these attacks are not solely the work of Wilayat Khurasan, but rather coordinated through the General Directorate of Provinces, involving multiple provinces.
Turkey has emerged as a significant node in ISIS’s global network, particularly for external operations planning. The Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow and a foiled plot in Germany both involved individuals with connections to Turkey. Turkey has become a hub for ISIS-related arrests, and Wilayat Turkiya networks are actively targeted by counter-terrorism financing efforts. These operations and networks fall under the purview of Maktab al-Faruq within the General Directorate of Provinces, further highlighting the directorate’s central role in coordinating attacks across regions.
The Iranian government’s claim that the Shiraz attack perpetrator trained in Turkey, along with evidence of financial networks operating through Turkey to support ISIS activities in Syria and beyond, reinforces Turkey’s pivotal role. This interconnectedness extends to ISIS supporter networks, with evidence of cross-provincial fundraising and operational coordination across Afghanistan, the Sahel, the Levant, and Europe.
Furthermore, recent disrupted plots in Germany, Kuwait, Israel, France, Sweden, and India show direct links to ISIS operatives in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Pakistan, demonstrating a wide geographical range of operational planning and support. These cases, highlighted by Aaron Zelin’s research and the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map project on War on the Rocks, illustrate that ISIS external operations are not confined to a single province but are a coordinated, pan-provincial effort orchestrated by the General Directorate of Provinces.
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Conclusion: Adapting Counter-Terrorism Strategies to the Evolving ISIS Threat
For policymakers, understanding the Islamic State’s evolved structure, particularly the role of the General Directorate of Provinces, is crucial. Focusing solely on Wilayat Khurasan as the primary actor in external operations provides an incomplete and potentially misleading picture. The Islamic State today is more integrated and globally coordinated than it was five years ago. Its focus on governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations persists, albeit in adapted forms, particularly in regions like Africa.
The challenge posed by ISIS requires a shift in counter-terrorism strategies. The playbook used against ISIS in Iraq and Syria may not be effective elsewhere, especially given evolving geopolitical landscapes and competing policy priorities. Ignoring the evolving reality of ISIS risks allowing it to regain prominence on the policy agenda, diverting resources from other critical long-term security concerns. Therefore, accurately understanding the Islamic State’s current structure and operational model, as consistently advocated by experts like Aaron Zelin and presented on platforms like War on the Rocks, is more critical than ever. Investing in this understanding now is a far more prudent approach than reacting to a future crisis.
This analysis underscores the importance of Aaron Zelin’s work in deciphering the complexities of the modern Islamic State. His contributions to War on the Rocks and broader scholarship provide invaluable insights for policymakers and analysts grappling with this persistent and evolving global security threat.
